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ABSTRACT
Long Life space systems developed from the early
1960's to the present day have demonstrated the
achievement of long life and high reliability in
a high technology space environment. With elec-
tronic parts improvements, decreasing failure
rates are leading to greater emphasis on the
elimination of design errors. The achievement
of reliability is dependent on three primary
-factors:—technicaT-capabi-lity7-good-judgement-r~
and discipline.
INTRODUCTION
My discussion will center primarily on the achievement of reliability
on long life, high reliability spacecraft. These utilize a combina-
tion of proven technology and new technology. The lives of these
spacecraft, for the most part, have been longer than anticipated.
When we started the Intelsat IV program, for example, noone had any
experience to indicate that a battery would last for the seven years
required.
Several of these spacecraft have introduced new technology without
compromising life or reliability. One recent development is the
Compact Hydrogen Maser frequency standard for Navigational Satellites,
delivered this year to NRL. It is still not space proven, but
initial clock comparison data indicated performance unsurpassed v
for a device of its size.
DISCUSSION
Figure one (1) shows the Hughes family of satellites. This family
started with the launch of Syncom (lower right corner) in 1963.
This was the world's first synchronous communication satellite. It
operated successfully until operation finally was discontinued in
1969. The newest member of this family in the upper left hand corner
is the Leasat. This satellite, to be launched in the 1980s is our
first spacecraft design optimized for a shuttle launch. Some other
spacecraft are worthy of note. The ATS, launched in 1965 for Goddard
Space Flight Center, is still providing useful data. The TACSAT,
launched for the air force in 1969, was the first gyrostat or dual
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DISCUSSION - Continued
spin-stabilized spacecraft. On the left hand side in Intelsat IV,
which was the first large International Communication Satellite.
It is capable of handling 9,000 simultaneous two-way telephone
conversations. The OSO, orbiting solar observatory, with the design
life of 3 years, was turned off after 4 years of successful operation.
Two spacecraft shown in this figure are shown more closely in Figure
2. Pioneer Venus Orbiter and Multiprobe spacecraft represented some
very difficult technological challenges. 33 different scientific
instruments for.taking atmospheric measurements in Venus were
integrated into these two spacecraft. For the probes that went to
the surface of Venus, this meant withstanding the high temperature
and acid of the Venus atmosphere plus the extremely high pressure
encountered at the Venus surface.
The next two figures (Figures 3 and 4) show the operational per-
formance of this family of satellites. Together they have accumu-
lated over 200 spacecraft years of successful operation. More than
15 billion electronic parts hours have been accumulated with less
than 30 failures attributable to electronic parts. None of these
part failures has had a significant impact on spacecraft operation.
These spacecraft have demonstrated several significant things
relative to reliability. First, they have demonstrated that long
life in the vicinity of 7 to 10 years is achievable with complex
space systems. ATS has demonstrated that, under the right
conditions, a life of 15 years or more is possible. Second, they
have demonstrated that the reliability of electronic parts can be
extremely high and a negligible factor in overall system reliability.
They have demonstrated another fact that is not apparent from these
charts. When you take any element or item for granted, it will be
the element that comes up and bites you. The only significant
problems we have had on orbiting satellites is with travelling
wave tubes. Due to oversights in the modification of existing
designs, we had early life failures of travelling wave tubes on
several spacecraft. Because of redundancy within the satellites,
the effect of the shorter tube life was minimized. The problems
have been corrected and we expect to get longer life on our tubes
in the future. The second illustration is a non Hughes satellite,
but it was one that caused a major investigation. The SEASAT had
an early failure of slip ring power transfer assembly. In this
case an existing proven design was used for a different application.
The difference in the application was not recognized initially and
eventually led to the failure of the satellite.
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What are the keys to achieving high reliability in a high technology
environment?
• Understand the Design
•. Design with conservatism
t Control Parts, Materials and Processes
t Test and Analyze
Understand the Design
Generally, there is a hesitancy on the part of the design engineer to
document Jits design,and dpcument__what_he understands about the design.
I have two concerns about this. One is, since the full understanding
of the design is in his head, what happens if someone else attempts
to supply that design? And second, does he really understand the
design or does he just think he does? The process of setting down
on paper how the design works and interacts with other hardware
systems generally leads to better understanding by the designer
himself. I can refer to a recent example, where a very competent
design engineer was requested to perform a hazard analysis. After
the explanation by the safety engineer, the design engineer spent a
day and a half fully documenting how his design works. He later
acknowledged that now not only were other people able to understand
how this design worked but he now understands it better himself.
Failure modes and effects analysis is an important tool in both
documenting the design and identifying what can happen to cause the
system to fail. Unfortunately failure modes analyses are often con-
ducted after the design process is complete. This results in
mechanically accomplishing the task to satisfy some contractual
requirement. With the great reduction in part failures, design error
or oversight becomes one of the principal causes of failures occurring
during ground test and system operations. Therefore, it is important
to identify and eliminate all failure modes as early as possible in
the design process. Failure modes and effects analysis can be divided
into the four areas listed below.
Functional - The functional FMEA should be initiated early. It shows
the interaction of all functions of the item and the role of the
individual hardware elements in the overall item operation.
Design - The design FMEA considers all hardware elements, their inputs
and outputs, down to the level necessary to determine the item's
failure mode and the potential of failure.
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Understand the Design - Continued
Interfaces - Commonly overlooked in an FMEA is the assessment of all
the interfaces and interconnections. I know of one case where the
conventional failure modes and effect analysis was performed orj
some complex hardware. By standard considerations, it was a good
FMEA. However, after some problems during system operations a
reliability engineer was assigned to reassess the failure modes
in that hardware. He found over 100 single point failures in that
system design. In order to accomplish this analysis he had to.
reconstruct the interconnects and the interfaces of all the elements
in that system.
Product Design - This is a new concept now being introduced.in some
programs. It is one which I feel will be one of the most constructive.
Great attention is often paid to circuit design and system design, but
product design, which can greatly affect the manufacturability and,
ultimately, the reliability of hardware is often overlooked. How
many of you have had a product design review?
Another element in understanding the design is testing - test to
determine design limitations, safety factors, and failure modes
that may have been overlooked in the failure modes and effect
analysis. Development tests and qualification tests generally are
aimed at proving the design capability of the hardware. While this
is valuable, I maintain that testing that uncovers no failures is
wasted testing. Sometime during the development process, tests
should be conducted on the hardware to accelerate the failures.
Failures can be accelerated through the application of environmental
or performance stresses. You cannot fully understand your design
until you know how it operates under extremes of temperature, thermal
cycling, vibration, or performance. If a system is designed to
operate for several years, it is not possible to fully evaluate that
system within normal time constraints without accelerated testing.
This testing must also consider the interfaces. Until all the
interfaces have been tested with the adjoining equipment, a full
understanding of that unit is not possible.
One other area that I think is very important in understanding the
design and helping to stay out of trouble is to modularize the
functions and the hardware. By this I mean divide the functions
and hardware into workable independent or semi-independent elements.
Design decisions are difficult under the most straightforward of
circumstances. If the hardware functions are so interrelated that
each decision affects all elements then you can count on overlooking
some element that later causes problems.
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Design with Conservatism
One of the keys to the success of our space systems has been the
conservative design. From early systems, parts derating has
been an important factor in achieving high reliability. The
thermal environment is extremely important. We generally try to
derate our parts to about 20% stress at 25° centigrade. If the
temperature goes up the stress goes down. At the most, parts
should not be operated over 50% of their rated values to achieve
high reliability.
What have you learned from your past experience? Utilize the past
experience and past problems to develop design guidelines. We have
developed design guidelines"~aime~d'~aT" preventing problems that pre-
viously have occurred or similar problems that might occur. Design
check lists provide a good tool for implementation of design guide-
lines and for design review.
Design with Safety Factors. This is a significant factor in achieve-
ment of overall reliability. And finally, there is redundancy. I
consider redundancy as a crutch to protect from what you do not know.
It also protects from errors that may be introduced during the
manufacturing process.
Parts, Materials and Processes Control
We establish a Parts, Materials and Processes Control Board (PMPCB)
at the beginning of each program. The objective is not to prevent
the introduction to the new parts and materials; rather it is to
manage the introduction of new parts and materials, and to assure
that proven parts and materials are used wherever possible.
Control of electronic parts through the manufacturing process, test,
application, and installation in hardware is extremely important.
As I said before, we have very few parts problems in Space. The
driving force for the controls we place on electronic parts has been
the failures on the ground. While high reliability parts may cost
more initially, the savings in parts replacement, equipment repair,
and test time usually more than compensate for the higher cost for
the parts. Control on the materials is just as important. They
should be properly specified, controlled, and analyzed so that all
the materials characteristics are understood.
Probably the best term to describe the control of manufacturing process
is "tender loving care". Introduction of new process specifications
also is approved by the PMPCB. The associated quality controls
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Parts, Materials and Processes Control - Continued
are tighter for high reliability products. Documentation is extremely
important, so that when a problem does occur, you can trace its source
and correct the cause.
Test and Analysis
I previously discussed the importance of the proper development and
qualification testing. A technique that has been found to be very
effective in producing a high reliability product, and at the same
time reducing manufacturing cost, is environmental stress screening.
This usually consists of thermal cycling, vibration, vacuum testing,
shock, or some combination thereof, applied at various hardware
levels. It may be applied as low as the card or module, or as high as
the system. It is most frequently applied at the black box level.
The objective of this testing is to stress the hardware sufficiently
to uncover workmanship or parts defects. At the same time, it is also
a good tool for finding design weaknesses. In one case, we applied
thermal cycling to a spacecraft after it had completed all the
acceptance tests and was ready for launch. In the process, a number
of failures were uncovered, at least six of which would have caused
significant spacecraft degradation during operation.
Generally tests should be conducted under conditions more severe than
operational conditions. Concern is often expressed that this may
cause wearout or early failures of your systems. Performed with
discretion, I know of no failures in Space on Hughes systems that
have been caused by over-testing. I do know of failures that have
occurred because of oversight. One important aspect of testing is
to test all modes of operations. This is not always possible during
system testing, therefore some of that testing must take place at
lower levels.
I think one of the keys to achievement of High Reliability Spacecraft
has been the fact that every failure is treated as a critical failure.
All failures should be reported, should be fully analyzed, and cor-
rective action should be identified and instituted wherever possible.
It sometimes takes time and costs money, but it will surely result
in a more reliable system. Do not overlook the analysis of all test
data. Numerous cases have occurred where failures occur in operation
and subsequent analysis of test data showed that the symptoms of the
failure had occurred but had been overlooked.
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CONCLUSIONS
There are no simple answers for achieving high reliability in a high
technology environment. Specific techniques that are applicable to
one contractor, one system or one hardware element are not necessarily
the same techniques that are applicable to another.
Failure-free hardware can be produced. The elements required to
achieve failure-free hardware are:
Technical expertise to design, analyze, and fully
understand the design.
Use of high reliability parts and materials
control of, and-tender loving care in, the
manufacturing processes. —
Testing to understand the system and weed
out defects.
Proper application of the above requires sound judgement in decision
making and the discipline necessary to follow proven practices.
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